Gobernancia del Sector Público, el Tuneleo y la Democracia

Este artículo escrito por Rodolfo Apreda y que se encuentra en el sitio de la fundación ATLAS es una buena introducción para comprender los problemas de CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, mencionados en mi paper sobre la República Ineficiente, tema mayormente investigado para el sector privado pero que ultimamente está siendo trasladado al sector público.
Vale esta transcripción para entender como se forma una democracia fraudulenta

IV. La democracia fraudulenta
En sentido amplio, para llevar a cabo una conducta fraudulenta, asistimos a un diseño voluntario e intencional de ocultamiento o deformación de los hechos6. En el fraude, un agente económico o político engaña a otro agente, de manera tal que el primero obtiene algún beneficio gracias al perjuicio del segundo. Decimos que una democracia representativa es fraudulenta cuando se la utiliza al servicio de un partido político, de un gobierno, o de un grupo de poder mafioso, para su propio beneficio, y por medio de un conjunto de procedimientos, entre los cuales podemos destacar los siguientes:
a) Se debilitan, obstaculizan o niegan derechos y garantías constitucionales.
b) El concepto y ejercicio de la democracia representativa se reduce a una metáfora publicitaria.
c) Hay manipulación de la justicia y se deteriora el principio de la “ ley está para ser cumplida” ( law enforcement).
d) Se impide la participación de los ciudadanos en el diseño y discusión de la agenda política.
e) Se fomentan el clientelismo político, la captura del estado y el tuneleo.
f) Deliberadamente, se diseñan marcos de acción política para que pierdan sentido las nociones de transparencia y accountability.

governancia.pdf Bajar artículo completo

Democratic Governance: The Key to Political and Economic Reform

Democratic Governance: The Key to Political and Economic Reform

Lack of democratic governance seriously threatens democracy-building and market-based reforms worldwide. In some countries, the absence of democratic governance has engendered populism, socialism, and even terrorism. Establishing the necessary governance institutions is essential to the future of democracy and free markets and to the stability of the international system.
The political, economic, and social consequences for countries lacking democratic governance include: widespread corruption; poor infrastructure; high business costs; low investment, growth, employment, and income levels; national, regional, and international instability; and growing citizen disappointment.
This paper presents a series of policy recommendations and strategies that provide members of the private sector and civil society, government officials, and foreign aid donors with essential tools to establish democratic governance. The report also highlights several case studies that reveal the experiences of CIPE and its partners in building better democracies. The report concludes by emphasizing that democratic governance is the linchpin for successful political and economic reform and that countries that have instituted democratic governance have achieved superior development outcomes.

Particularmente interesante encontré el Box1 en página 2 del mismo paper donde habla sobre las definiciones de Governance, y las similitudes con mi paper

Common Definitions of Governance
World Bank: The World Bank defines governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. Th is
includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to eff ectively manage its resources
and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.
United Nations Development Programme: Governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s aff airs
at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.

Definition of Democratic Governance
CIPE: Democratic governance comprises the traditions, institutions, and processes that determine how government decisions are made on a daily basis, and
addresses the following questions:
• How and to what extent are citizens given a voice in day-to-day policymaking?
• How efficiently are public resources and services managed?
• How are abuses of governmental power prevented?
• How are government offi cials held accountable for their actions?
• How are grievances redressed?

Sound democratic governance mechanisms help to create functioning democracies.

Bajar paper completo: IP0405.pdf (Objeto application/pdf)

Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness: Books

Parece interesante este libro, aún no ha sido publicado, pero ya se puede reservar en Amazon.

Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (Paperback)
by Steven Levitsky (Editor), Maria Victoria Murillo (Editor)
# Paperback: 320 pages
# Publisher: Pennsylvania State University Press (January 18, 2006)
# Language: English
# ISBN: 0271027169

Reservar en Amazon: Amazon.com: Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness: Books

The media in Argentina: No criticisms please

As he has done for the past 20 years, Pepe Eliaschev ended his radio show on Argentina's public broadcaster on December 30th by urging his audience to tune in next week. Just minutes later, he says, the station's boss told him that an order had come “from above” to drop the programme, despite a contractual requirement of at least a week's notice.

The sacking of Mr Eliaschev, a critic of the government, is unusual chiefly for its heavy-handedness. Since the return of democracy in Argentina in 1983, freedom of expression has been guaranteed by law. But since then criticism of the government in Argentina's media has never been as scarce as it is now, many journalists say. Through incentives and veiled threats, President Néstor Kirchner has secured a remarkably favourable press.

One of the government's tools is money. The robust recovery in Argentina's economy since its collapse of 2001-02 has boosted tax revenues. That has brought an eightfold increase in the real value of the federal publicity budget (to $46m in 2006) since Mr Kirchner took office in 2003. Argentine governments have a long tradition of funnelling official advertising to sympathetic media and withholding it from others. That applies just as much to provincial governments. According to a study by the Association for Civil Rights (ADC) in Buenos Aires, in the sparsely populated province of Tierra del Fuego official advertising accounts for three-quarters of the total revenues of local media, for example.

The national media are less dependent on public advertising, but have received other favours. The government has been particularly kind to the Clarín Group, Argentina's largest media conglomerate. After the devaluation of the peso in 2002, the group—like many other Argentine companies—defaulted on its dollar debts. When its creditors threatened to take it over, Congress passed a law capping any foreigners' stake in “cultural goods” at 30%. The government has also extended for ten years the group's cable-television licences. Perhaps not surprisingly, Clarín, Argentina's biggest-selling daily has tended to back the government.

Página/12, a left-leaning daily founded to crusade for human rights, was once committed to investigative journalism. It has become a mouthpiece for Mr Kirchner. In return, the government has pumped in money. The ADC reckons that in a sample two-week period in 2004 Página/12 received just 17% less public advertising than Clarín, although its circulation is small.

Individual journalists have also received official favours. Some of the leading print columnists also rent slots on cable-television channels. They present commentary programmes, receiving some of the ad revenue—much of which may come from the government. “Everyone has mixed interests,” says María O'Donnell, a former correspondent for La Nación, the most critical of the dailies. “Journalists are part of the system, and there's no code of ethics to address conflicts.”

Media which have not been co-opted may face low-level coercion. Typically, that means aggressive phone calls from officials after critical stories, followed by the subsequent denial of interviews or seats on the presidential aircraft. Last July, shortly after calling journalists “schizophrenic” and “hysterical”, Mr Kirchner quipped that photographers were the best reporters because they don't ask questions. The president rarely answers them—he has granted no full interviews.

Mainly because of the economy's recovery, Mr Kirchner is popular. He could argue that his predecessors have used many of the same techniques. Carlos Menem used the privatisation of television to secure friendly coverage. An inquisitive photographer was murdered on the orders of a businessman with links to his government. The dictatorship of 1976-83 simply imposed censorship and used violence against journalists.

But there is widespread agreement among journalists that Mr Kirchner has taken government influence over the media to a new peak of subtle intensity. He is taking other steps to concentrate power in his own hands. He has announced a plan to change the independent judicial council to give him more sway over the courts. Argentines may come to rue a lack of scrutiny of their government.

Source: The Economist

Reforma Politica Ya

Mas de lo mismo...la reforma que nunca llega.

LA NACION LINE

Block the Vote

Block the Vote
By PAUL KRUGMAN

Earlier this week former employees of Sproul & Associates (operating under the name Voters Outreach of America), a firm hired by the Republican National Committee to register voters, told a Nevada TV station that their supervisors systematically tore up Democratic registrations.

The accusations are backed by physical evidence and appear credible. Officials have begun a criminal investigation into reports of similar actions by Sproul in Oregon.

Republicans claim, of course, that they did nothing wrong - and that besides, Democrats do it, too. But there haven't been any comparably credible accusations against Democratic voter-registration organizations. And there is a pattern of Republican efforts to disenfranchise Democrats, by any means possible.

Some of these, like the actions reported in Nevada, involve dirty tricks. For example, in 2002 the Republican Party in New Hampshire hired an Idaho company to paralyze Democratic get-out-the-vote efforts by jamming the party's phone banks.

But many efforts involve the abuse of power. For example, Ohio's secretary of state, a Republican, tried to use an archaic rule about paper quality to invalidate thousands of new, heavily Democratic registrations.

That attempt failed. But in Wisconsin, a Republican county executive insists that this year, when everyone expects a record turnout, Milwaukee will receive fewer ballots than it got in 2000 or 2002 - a recipe for chaos at polling places serving urban, mainly Democratic voters.

And Florida is the site of naked efforts to suppress Democratic votes, and the votes of blacks in particular.

Florida's secretary of state recently ruled that voter registrations would be deemed incomplete if those registering failed to check a box affirming their citizenship, even if they had signed an oath saying the same thing elsewhere on the form. Many counties are, sensibly, ignoring this ruling, but it's apparent that some officials have both used this rule and other technicalities to reject applications as incomplete, and delayed notifying would-be voters of problems with their applications until it was too late.

Whose applications get rejected? A Washington Post examination of rejected applications in Duval County found three times as many were from Democrats, compared with Republicans. It also found a strong tilt toward rejection of blacks' registrations.

The case of Florida's felon list - used by state officials, as in 2000, to try to wrongly disenfranchise thousands of blacks - has been widely reported. Less widely reported has been overwhelming evidence that the errors were deliberate.

In an article coming next week in Harper's, Greg Palast, who originally reported the story of the 2000 felon list, reveals that few of those wrongly purged from the voting rolls in 2000 are back on the voter lists. State officials have imposed Kafkaesque hurdles for voters trying to get back on the rolls. Depending on the county, those attempting to get their votes back have been required to seek clemency for crimes committed by others, or to go through quasi-judicial proceedings to prove that they are not felons with similar names.

And officials appear to be doing their best to make voting difficult for those blacks who do manage to register. Florida law requires local election officials to provide polling places where voters can cast early ballots. Duval County is providing only one such location, when other counties with similar voting populations are providing multiple sites. And in Duval and other counties the early voting sites are miles away from precincts with black majorities.

Next week, I'll address the question of whether the votes of Floridians with the wrong color skin will be fully counted if they are cast. Mr. Palast notes that in the 2000 election, almost 180,000 Florida votes were rejected because they were either blank or contained overvotes. Demographers from the U.S. Civil Rights Commission estimate that 54 percent of the spoiled ballots were cast by blacks. And there's strong evidence that this spoilage didn't reflect voters' incompetence: it was caused mainly by defective voting machines and may also reflect deliberate vote-tampering.

The important point to realize is that these abuses aren't aberrations. They're the inevitable result of a Republican Party culture in which dirty tricks that distort the vote are rewarded, not punished. It's a culture that will persist until voters - whose will still does count, if expressed strongly enough - hold that party accountable.

The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: Block the Vote

Democracry? Saving the Vote

Democracry? Saving the Vote
by PAUL KRUGMAN

Everyone knows it, but not many politicians or mainstream journalists are willing to talk about it, for fear of sounding conspiracy-minded: there is a substantial chance that the result of the 2004 presidential election will be suspect.

When I say that the result will be suspect, I don't mean that the election will, in fact, have been stolen. (We may never know.) I mean that there will be sufficient uncertainty about the honesty of the vote count that much of the world and many Americans will have serious doubts...

...It's horrifying to think that the credibility of our democracy - a democracy bought through the courage and sacrifice of many brave men and women - is now in danger. It's so horrifying that many prefer not to think about it. But closing our eyes won't make the threat go away. On the contrary, denial will only increase the chances of a disastrously suspect election.

Full article: The New York Times > Opinion > Op-Ed Columnist: Saving the Vote

Democracy's low-level equilibrium

Latin Americans believe their democracies benefit a privileged few, not the many—but they don't want a return to dictatorship

CONTRARY to much punditry suggesting that the region risks a return to authoritarianism, roughly half of Latin Americans continue to support democracy, though few think it is working well. A much larger majority backs the market economy. Politicians are slightly less unpopular than of late. But worries about unemployment, poverty, corruption and crime test faith in democracy. Many Latin Americans would sacrifice some freedoms for order and greater prosperity. And their view of the United States is much less favourable than in the mid-1990s. These are some of the conclusions of the latest Latinobarómetro poll of political and social attitudes in 18 Latin American countries published exclusively by The Economist.

Latinobarómetro, a Chilean organisation, has carried out similar surveys each year since the mid-1990s, so the poll captures shifts in opinion in the region. This year's survey shows broad stability in attitudes, despite an improving economy (the region should see economic growth of 4.5% or so this year, the highest since 1997). That may be because of the lag before growth is reflected in higher incomes or more jobs. Or it may be because of deeper-rooted failures in democratic performance.



Economist.com. The Latinobarómetro poll

The New York Times > Opinion > The Senate Report

The New York Times > Opinion > The Senate Report

: " ...The committee said the analysts who had produced that false apocalyptic vision had fallen into a 'collective groupthink' in which evidence was hammered into a preconceived pattern...."

Como encaja esto con la Racionalidad Colectiva como uno de los supuestos de la Teoria Economica??? Puede ser engañada toda una sociedad mediante habiles operaciones de prensa?????
O muy pocos se animan a pensar por si mismos????

Y porque este post en este Capítulo?? Bueno, esto es una muestra más de ciertas fallas que permiten la manipulación dentro de una Democracia.

PRODDAL - Informe sobre la Democracia en América Latina - 2004

Es hora de mejorar la democracia si no queremos perderla. Asi como existe hoy en Argentina, no sirve.

PRODDAL - Informe sobre la Democracia en América Latina - 2004

Democracia & Desigualdad. Sobre la “democracia real” a fines del siglo XX

Democracia & Desigualdad. Sobre la "democracia real" a fines del siglo XXI
Autor: Carlos Strasser

En las últimas décadas del siglo XX la democracia ha triunfado a escala mundial. Sin embargo, en el mismo tiempo también lo ha hecho la desigualdad. ¿Qué es esto? La democracia no es un régimen cualquiera de gobierno sino la mejor de las formas políticas comparadas que puede tomar el estado; la desigualdad, una afrenta o un estigma de la condición social. Y ahora ambas vienen juntas. Mayor desigualdad social en tiempos de mayor igualdad política, ¿se trata de una paradoja?

Ninguna paradoja. Aquel acompañamiento lamentable no señala tan sólo una simple correlación intrigante: sugiere que se concretó una asociación perfectamente posible. Y quienes la descartan dejaron escapar que la democracia está siempre y por principio englobada por un orden estatal-social mayor que el suyo, un orden en el que ya en sí misma la democracia de nuestro tiempo no es una simple democracia. Por lo pronto, no puede serlo.

Puede pensarse que la desigualdad ha aumentado pese a la democracia; que, sin ella, el panorama resultante habría sido peor. Pero esto no cancela por fuerza la asociación Democracia-Desigualdad, y es de lo que se trata. La cuestión se presenta más enrevesada.

Lo que está en cuestión es cómo y por qué las democracias conocidas cargan con alguna parte de la culpa por el tremendo cuadro de desigualdad y crecimiento de la desigualdad que hoy tenemos delante nuestro.

Lo que hay para averiguar y entender es la naturaleza y la operatoria misma de lo que podemos llamar “la democracia real”, la que (en parte porque es la “lógicamente” posible, en parte porque es la históricamente desarrollada) da en producir resultados varios y no siempre congruentes entre sí, como también consecuencias no sólo contradictorias sino y aun opuestas.

Leer y bajar el libro en CLACSO

Indice
Prefacio
¿Más Democracia, más Desigualdad?

Primera parte
En torno a la igualdad y la democracia dos cuestiones previas de enfoque

Capítulo 1
Las caras bifrontes del proceso y la teoría
Apéndice
La Desigualdad, algunos datos básicos de América Latina y la Argentina.

Capítulo 2
Sobre la democracia. Acerca de su relación con la igualdad

Segunda parte
La "democracia real" contemporánea. El marco histórico y teórico.

Introducción

Capítulo 3
La marca indeleble de la modernidad burguesa

Capítulo 4
Ciudadanía y democracia hoy. América Latina y Argentina

Capítulo 5
La democracia, clave de bóveda

Tercera parte
Un campo de experiencia. "El espejo".

Introducción

Capítulo 6
Un campo adecuado

Apéndice
Datos básicos del Presupuesto Nacional, Años 1998 y 1999, según su aprobación en 1997 y 1998.

Capítulo 7
Lo que refleja el espejo

Apéndice

Epílogo
Nuevamente, las caras bifrontes del proceso y la teoría.

Votacion Nominal Obligatoria

La mayoría de las leyes sancionadas en la Argentina no cuenta con un registro oficial sobre el modo en que han votado los legisladores. A favor de la transparencia, es necesario instrumentar el voto nominal obligatorio.

por Roberto Saba. PROFESOR DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (UBA Y PALERMO).


El 26 de abril de 2000 se votó la Ley de Reforma Laboral en el Senado. Tal como nos informó Clarín el 19 de diciembre pasado, el único indicio con el que contamos para saber cómo votaron nuestros representantes es un video.

En él se puede apreciar el modo en que el senador Gioja, hoy sospechado de haber recibido un soborno para votar afirmativamente, llevó a cabo un "voto a la peinada": se pasa la mano por el pelo, se toca levemente la cara, se acomoda los anteojos y se inclina para hablar con Eduardo Bauzá, según la nota periodística. Esta actitud confusa no permite asegurar si votó afirmativa o negativamente.

¿Es posible que un acto de la trascendencia de la aprobación de una ley sea realizado de esta forma? ¿Es evitable que este tipo de cosas ocurran? Desde luego que sí.

La mayoría de las leyes sancionadas en la Argentina no cuenta con un registro oficial sobre el modo en que han votado los legisladores. Sólo quedan indicios parciales e inciertos de estas votaciones en las versiones taquigráficas de los debates previos.

En el Congreso existen tres modos diferentes de votar las leyes: a mano alzada (de lo que no queda prácticamente ningún registro); con constancia del tipo y la cantidad de votos (pero sin registro de quiénes votaron de un modo u otro), y por medio del "voto nominal" (procedimiento por el cual queda registrado el modo en que votó cada legislador). Mientras en los Estados Unidos y en Chile, por ejemplo, este último tipo de votación —indispensable para un verdadero control político de la ciudadanía respecto de sus representantes— es el más frecuente, en nuestro país se utiliza en un número reducido de casos.

Según un trabajo realizado en la Universidad de Harvard, un buen número de políticos latinoamericanos argumenta que la votación nominal no es necesaria dado que en la región existe una fuerte tradición de disciplina partidaria que permite saber cómo votan los representantes al conocer la posición de los partidos que integran. Esto, sencillamente, no es cierto.

Frente a la imposibilidad de que quede registrado su voto debido a la voluntad negativa de la mayoría de sus pares, muchos legisladores se ven forzados a brindar su opinión durante el debate para que quede, al menos de ese modo indirecto, algún registro de su posición en las versiones taquigráficas del mismo, o a solicitar se consigne expresamente su voto. En otras ocasiones, la inexistencia del voto nominal permite que un partido declame en los medios de comunicación una posición respecto de un proyecto de ley, mientras que en el recinto algunos de sus miembros votan en forma distinta. Algunos diputados prefieren que la votación no sea nominal para votar justamente lo que consideran es correcto sin recibir represalias de su partido cuando éste ordenó hacer lo contrario.

Dado que en el caso de la Ley de Reforma Laboral no se optó por la nominalidad, hoy los ciudadanos no podemos saber de qué modo votaron los senadores. De la lectura de la versión taquigráfica del debate parlamentario de ese día podría deducirse, a partir de los dichos de los senadores, que once de ellos votaron afirmativamente y que cuatro votaron en contra. Lamentablemente, jamás podremos saber con seguridad no sólo si esas escasas manifestaciones públicas fueron correspondidas coherentemente con votos en uno u otro sentido, sino que tampoco sabremos cómo votó el resto de los senadores (que suponemos fueron entre 41 y 44).

El Reglamento de la Cámara faculta —no obliga— a los senadores a pedir la consignación de su voto, si ese es su deseo. Nuestro derecho político a fiscalizar la actividad de los representantes está sujeto a que los senadores "quieran" dejar constancia de sus votos. En este caso, la mayoría de ellos "no quiso". El control de la ciudadanía no puede depender del deseo de los controlados.

Mientras se reúnen los enormes consensos que una reforma política integral demanda, sería interesante avanzar con "pequeños grandes cambios" como el que establecería el voto nominal obligatorio de todas las leyes.

Reformas como ésta permitirían a la ciudadanía, con poco esfuerzo, operar enormes modificaciones en la conducta de nuestros representantes con miras a mejorar la política, provocando un debate sustantivo más robusto, un mayor control político y un ejercicio más efectivo de los derechos de los ciudadanos.

(Coincido plenamente)